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INTRODUCTION 
 
"I was at pains to consider the miserable condition of the old man; and now my alms, 
giving some relief, doth also ease me." 
- Thomas Hobbes on why he gives sixpence to a beggar 
 
The importance of benevolence has been recognized in the long tradition of 
economics treated as a moral science, dating back at least to Adam Smith (1759). 
Notable modern exponents include Becker (1974); Boulding (1969); Frank (1990), 
Hausman and McPherson (1993); Kolm and Mercier Ythier (2006); Sen (1995). 
Benevolence as a moral disposition is driven chiefly by concern for the welfare of 
others. The expected benefits, though, are also mutual – that is, the benefactor as well 
as the beneficiary would elicit gains. Moralists have often questioned the extent of 
altruism involved in benevolent acts which may be motivated to a larger extent by 
self-righteousness. Such an example is the story of the widow’s mite (Mark 12, pp.38-
44, Luke 20, pp.45-47, 21, pp.1-4), in which the sacrificial altruism of the poor person 
who gives everything she has to others is contrasted with the less meritorious 
motivation of benevolence – namely, the desire to ‘feel good’ about oneself. The 
latter motivation may be more relevant to the subject of this paper – that is, the 
analysis of the factors behind the recent expansion of Fairtrade (FT).  
This paper deals exclusively with “Fairtrade”, the labelling channel for 
marketing FT products. It is written in one word to distinguish it from the overall fair 
trade movement. FT aims to protect small producers against price volatility and 
inadequate incomes as well as to provide community benefits (health care, education). 
It relies on consumer purchases of FT products carried out at agreed minimum prices.   3
These purchases measure the trust accorded to the scheme which is founded on a 
system of certification comprising a series of recommended producer welfare-
enhancing standards that FT products must satisfy. These standards conform to a code 
developed by the members of the International Social and Environmental 
Accreditation and Labelling Alliance (ISEAL)
1. The Fairtrade Labelling Organization 
International (FLO), created in 1997, defines and applies these standards through two 
organizations. FLO International establishes FT norms, while FLO-cert endeavours to 
ensure that the actors involved comply with them.
2  
In this paper, a Fairtrade consumer (FTC) buying FT products is assumed to 
be motivated by a sense of fairness, reflected in the FTC’s willingness to pay more for 
the same product “in order to avoid large deviations from what they consider a fair 
solution” (Cappelen et al., 2007, p.818).
3 This motivation leads some authors to label 
the FT consumer as “ethical” (see for example Bird and Hughes 1997, Leclair 2002, 
Levi and Linton 2003, Maseland and de Vaal 2002, Raynolds 2002). The belief or 
knowledge of contributing to an improved standard of living for poor producers in the 
South elicits satisfaction in the FTC. The components of this agreeable feeling may 
include self-esteem, the perceived membership of a desired social stratum, and 
enjoying praise, gratitude, esteem and admiration from others.
4 The overall 
satisfaction resulting from some combination of these elements is called in this paper 
the “feel-good” factor. 
Fairtrade organizations (FTOs) instil this feel-good factor by supplying stories 
to accompany FT product sales which aim to appeal to the potential FT consumer’s 
humanitarian sentiments (Renard, 2003, p.90).
5 An example of this is the core 
proposition of the Fairtrade Fortnight 2008, which states “Feel-good by changing your 
choices and changing people’s lives”.
6 However, FT is defined by the exchange of   4
“positive and negative stories” about it, and “accuracy is a nicety more than a 
requirement for these stories” (Burt, 2008, p.1). Indeed, the activity of FTOs is based 
on the assumption that FT is always good whatever the product or the location. They 
do not carry out diligent studies claiming to measure whether FT has indeed improved 
the living standards of small farmers (Masseland and de Vaal, 2002, p.269). 
Given that FT relies on feel-good stories to evolve and to build the reputation 
of its brand as an alternative trade model, it becomes relevant to analyse how these 
stories are disseminated and how stable the acquired reputation is. Section II reviews 
the literature dedicated to describing the incentives and actual effects corresponding 
to FT. At this point, it is worth noting that various authors express doubts with regard 
to the actual benefits generated by this form of trade. Section III builds on Glaeser 
(2005)’s to develop a model for investigating the role of feel-good stories in the 
development of FT. Section IV applies the model to understand why FT has expanded 
but also why it could collapse. Finally, section V concludes. 
 
II. THE DEMAND FOR FT PRODUCTS 
 
Commodity prices are highly volatile and this volatility affects the living conditions 
of farmers around the world. To address price volatility, numerous schemes aimed at 
stabilizing commodity prices have been conceived, ranging over price controls, 
marketing boards, stabilization funds and international commodity agreements such as 
STABEX, the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) and the retention plan of the 
Association of Coffee Producing Countries (ACPC)
7. The preferred market 
instrument is the futures market. While widely used by importers, and mutual funds, 
futures markets cannot easily be accessed by small farmers, due to the large trading   5
volumes on those markets and lack of training facilities (Ronchi, 2006, p.10).  
Consumers do not seem to be affected by price volatility to the same extent as 
producers. When producer prices are low, consumer prices remain high. This 
phenomenon has been termed the “coffee paradox”, (Daviron and Ponte, 2006). FT 
aims to exploit this paradox by reducing the gap between producer and consumer 
price and the most commonly cited welfare gains for producers resulting from such 
FT actions are increased incomes, price stability, capacity building and long term 
social benefits.  
 
A. Price Stability and Increased Income 
Price stability and increased income are ensured by providing a minimum FT price, 
which varies by product and community. In all cases the aim is to cover the cost of 
production, the cost of living and the cost of complying with FT standards (Nicholls 
and Opal, 2005, p.41). The cost of production is based on surveys. The cost of living 
in each country is estimated through proxies such as daily interest rates and daily 
minimum wages. The costs of complying with FT standards include those of 
belonging to a co-operative, organizing a workers assembly, paperwork associated 
with inspections and reporting to FLO, and attending world and regional FT assembly 
meetings. At the outset, the FLO system was able to fund the initial costs of 
certification for producer groups. This practice was later abandoned as it became 
financially unsustainable.  
The views in the literature on the benefits that this minimum price provides 
are mixed. In his study of farmers in Northern Nicaragua, Bacon (2005) concludes 
that participation in organic and FT networks does reduce vulnerability to low coffee 
prices. Vihinenen and Lee (2004, p.5, Table 2) note that the unit price earned by   6
producers operating within the FT scheme is almost four times higher than the price 
they receive per unit of conventional coffee. Similarly, Pariente (2000) observes that 
setting a base price affords a significant benefit to a co-operative of coffee producers 
in Costa Rica.  
While not contesting these results, Leclair (2002) and Maseland and de Vaal 
(2002), however, raised concerns about the risk of market distortion. If producers are 
paid above the value of their marginal product, they observe that this would 
encourage higher output with risks of overproduction and of locking farmers into 
unprofitable activities. Such distortions are observed for instance by Castro (2001) in 
his Guatemalan case study. Indeed, most of the commodities targeted by FT are 
oversupplied. For coffee, this means that less than 20% of coffee can be sold at the FT 
price (Giovannucci with Koekoek, 2003). Bacon (2005, p.505) found that most 
farmers sell coffee to organic, FT and conventional markets, reducing the average 
price for all coffee sold far below the price paid by the FT scheme. Berndt (2007, 
p.16) mentions that Fedecocagua, the largest FT co-operative in Guatemala, sells only 
about 23 percent of its production to FT buyers and that Coocafe, a FT co-operative in 
Costa Rica, sells 20 percent as FT coffee. With regards to chocolate, the percentage of 
cocoa sold to FT companies is currently less than 3 per cent (Berlan, 2006, p.8). 
Therefore much of the cocoa produced by FT farmers is sold in the mainstream 
market. Dankers with Liu (2003) report that excess supply of FT bananas forced 
Agrofair, a Dutch Fair Trade organisation, to sell bananas at prices below the cost of 
production. The same authors cite the case of a coffee co-operative operating in 
Tanzania where the proportion of FT coffee sold is so small that the FT price hardly 
affects the average price received by individual farmers. This is liable to occur when 
producer groups that are FT certified are not guaranteed a FT purchaser.    7
The reason for this to occur is that FT remains a small movement. Its most 
widely sold product, coffee, has achieved no more than a 1-2% share of the retail 
coffee market in most OECD markets (Vihinen and Lee, 2004, Table 1). 
Setting minimum prices above the free market price risks leaving poor 
producers dependent on products for which no viable market exists outside the FT 
system. FT may thereby prolong producers’ economic dependence by reliance on a 
niche market of socially-conscious consumers (Leclair, 2002; Maseland and De Vaal 
2002). For these authors, therefore, FT is seen as an inefficient means of transferring 
income from consumers to producers compared with an economically efficient direct 
transfer.  
One solution for FT would be to focus on these products that are labour 
intensive with inelastic demand curves such as high quality coffee beans (Bates 
1997). Maseland and de Vaal (2002) found that the price elasticity of the product 
determines the relative benefit of FT to producers. If demand for the product is 
relatively inelastic, the product will be exported even if the price of the raw material is 
high, thus the allocation of resources to inefficient production processes due to 
increased prices is not very relevant. Berndt (2007) evidenced that high quality coffee 
commands prices much higher than the minimum FT price, with a similarly positive 
effect in the volume traded. The evidence the author obtains also shows why some co-
operatives, such as Coope Llano Bonito in Costa Rica, manage to sell around 40 
percent of their production to FT traders, due to their location in prime growing 
conditions ensuring higher quality coffee, while most of the other FT co-operatives 
are located in low quality production area (Berndt, 2007, p.16).  
An argument in favour of FT is the fact that these products have been produced 
by FT producers, which is in itself positive. For Becchetti and Costantino (2006) the   8
FT movement supports the rise of socially responsible consumers, and data provided 
by the “2003 Corporate social responsibility monitor” seems to support this 
conclusion (Business and Sustainable Development, 2003). For Krier (2005, p.5) as 
well, FT has become much more than a “niche market” for socially-aware and 
middle-class Northern consumers. FT can therefore be seen as a conveyor of positive 
externalities. This may be behind the decision taken by four main coffee companies, 
which together represent 80 per cent of the international coffee market, to implement 
a ‘Common Code’ for the Coffee Community. This decision may in part reflect the 
consumer education programs undertaken by the FT organizations (Williamson, 2004) 
that is, their influencing the behaviour of mainstream companies when sourcing their 
products (Tallontire, 2002). The ‘Common Code’ requires coffee farm workers to 
receive fair wages and working conditions as well as protecting their rights to join 
trade unions. 
 
B. Capacity building and long-term social benefits 
Capacity building and long-term social benefits are ensured by the social premium. 
The premium is paid to the local co-operative or farm worker association. It is 
considered “social” because the funded projects must involve community benefits, 
such as providing for health care and education (although dividend payouts are also 
allowed). Once the minimum FT price is calculated, the total FT price results from the 
sum of the minimum FT price and the social premium. In the case of coffee, for 
example, the minimum FT price tracks the world price determined on the New York 
Coffee Exchange (NYCE). It is set at $1.21/lb. The social premium was initially fixed 
at $0.05/lb, but increased on 1 June 2007 to $0.10/lb.
8 This guarantees that the total 
FT price is always at least 10 cents higher than the world price and never below   9
$1.31/lb. 
For some, this premium leaves open the question of whether it makes sense to 
offer long-term support to local FT associations which may be inefficient, and may, 
thus perpetuate dependency and be a development trap (MacMillan, 2006, p.19). The 
counterargument is to point out that the social premium has a significant impact on 
investment in education as shown by Becchetti and Costantino (2006) in their study of 
120 Kenyan farmers. This may suggest that the next generation will not be “trapped” 
and will be able to decide whether to stay on the farm or to leave based on economic 
considerations. Hopkins (2000) draws the conclusion from his analysis of 18 separate 
case studies that FT’s greatest developmental strength is to be found in the area of 
‘capacity building’. For Raynolds (2002), there is an organisational benefit from the 
farmers getting together to discuss how the premium should be put to use. 
We have seen in this section that views on FT are divided, with some authors 
more disposed than others to see benefits in the initiative. Whatever the pros and cons, 






The FT scheme relies on creating large and sustainable demand for FT products, 
which requires raising public awareness to create consumer demand and thus prompt 
retailers to offer FT products (Levi and Linton, 2003, p.419). Some consumers may 
be persuaded by the positive accounts of the welfare effects of FT; for others, the 
decision to buy FT products can be made only after verifying the truth of the claims 
about FT in public awareness programmes. However, the consumer does not have at   10
her disposal a “large laboratory, ready to deliver current information quickly and 
gratuitously” Stigler (1961, p.224). This is why it is important to incorporate into the 
model the costs which must be born by consumers who decide to investigate the 
validity of the claimed benefits of FT. 
 
A. The Demand for feel-good stories 
Adapting Glaeser’s (2005) model to the specific features of FT, this section analyses 
how FTOs make FTCs aware of FT products by organising campaigns and diffusing 
stories about the benefits of FT to poor producers from developing countries. 
Campaigns and slogans such as “the Fair Trade success story” (see Krier, 2005, p.8) 
are designed to shift rightwards consumer demand curves for FT products (Levi and 
Linton, 2003, p.408). Conditioned by FTOs stories, the FT consumer
  drives the 
expansion of FT by her demand for products certified as FT goods.  
FTOs are defined as organisations promoting FT through product certification 
and sheltered under the FLO. The FTO stories carry little or no direct information 
other than that FT is beneficial. Accordingly with Nelson (1974) and Milgrom and 
Roberts (1986) FTOs are assumed to be only interested in selling FT, not in providing 
information.  
FTCs are broadly defined as consumers preferring a higher price for a given 
quantity of a product, because they accept as true that some of the sale proceeds go to 
the FT producer group thereby improving their living conditions. Informed by these 
stories, FTCs base their purchase of the FT product on maximizing their expected 
payoff defined as follows: 
 
Payoff = Income increment of FTPs + Feel-good from subsidizing FTPs – search   11
costs – price mark up. 
 
FT producers (FTPs) may be farmers or workers in an association or a 
cooperative who join the FT scheme to improve their standard of living but have no 
role in this model aside from joining FT. The sale of FT products is beneficial to FTPs 
with probability θ. With probability (1- θ) FTPs do not benefit from FT (given the 
controversy in the literature reported in the previous section on the actual benefits of 
FT).  
FTCs can assess the true extent of the benefits enjoyed by FTPs only if they 
undertake research which will have a cost (the search cost – s), for instance, in terms 
of foregone leisure time. φ is the probability (belief) that FTCs assign to FT stories. 
This probability indicates that these stories from FTOs are not enough to conclude 
that FT is overwhelmingly beneficial. Therefore a FTC will believe that FT products 
are beneficial to FTP with the following conditional probability )) 1 ( /( θ φ θ θ − + . 
The FTC is then faced with the option of investigating the veracity of FTO 
stories. If she believes a story to be true without research, her feel-good factor will 
amount to  ( ); d is the perceived positive effect of the FT scheme and   is the 
average after tax income of FTPs. But if, after researching, she establishes beyond 
doubt that FT is beneficial then the certainty stemming from having verified the 
exactitude of the story has the effect of increasing the feel-good factor to 
0
~ y d 0 〉 d 0
~ y
0
~ y d δ  ( 1 > δ ) 
but with the expense of the search cost, s. δ is the FTC’s definitive assessment of the 
benefits of the FT scheme.  
Therefore the decision whether to research depends on the search cost, 
characterized by a density function h(s) and its cumulative distribution H(s), which 
differs among FTCs according to income, location, access to internet, transportation   12
costs (Nelson, 1974, p.730) , tastes and time (Stigler, 1961, p.216). 
For the FTC, purchasing FT product means spending the price mark up on FT 
goods. The margin by which FT goods on average are more expensive is denoted here 
as r . To make sure that spending r is optimal both for the FTC who, after research, is 
happy that FT is beneficial, and for the FTC who has not done any research but is 
nevertheless willing to buy FT products, the expected payoffs in both cases are 
assumed to be large enough to make them willing to buy FTPs, which implies 
s y d ≥ − + − )) 1 ( /( ( ~
0 θ φ θ θ δ  
If a FTC does not conduct any research, her expected payoff from buying FT 
goods and spending r equals  r y d − − + )) 1 ( /( ~
0 θ φ θ θ , this is assumed to be greater than 
zero so that FTCs want to buy FT products. 
If FTC does conduct research and discovers that FTPs are not better off under 
FT, the net benefit is negative and equals –s. If she finds out that FTPs are better off, 
her net benefit equals  r s y d − − 0
~ δ . Therefore the total expected gains for FTCs from 
research is  ) 1 ( ) ~ ( 0 θ δ θ − − − − s r s y d . 
The FTC who has undertaken research and learned that FTPs do not benefit 
from FT will not buy FT products and therefore will not spend the price mark-up, 
saving herself net expenditure of r – s. 
 
Proposition 1. Investigating the veracity of the alleged FT benefits in FTOs’ 
feel-good stories is optimal for FTCs if and only if s is less than the threshold search 
costs s*= ) 1 ( )) 1 ( /( 1 ( ~
0 θ θ φ θ δ θ − + − + − r y d . 
 
Proof. For research to be undertaken by FTCs, the expected payoff of searching for 
proofs of FT benefits must be greater than or equal to the expected payoff from not   13
searching, or:  ≥ − − − − ) 1 ( ) ~ ( 0 θ δ θ s r s y dr y d − − + )) 1 ( /( ~
0 θ φ θ θ . After transformation, 
this yields the following expression: s ) 1 ( )) 1 ( /( 1 ( ~
0 θ θ φ θ δ θ − + − + − ≤ r y d . 
 
Assuming that FTOs disseminate feel-good stories, the proportion of FTCs not 
doing research because they consider search costs to be too high but nevertheless 
accepting that FT is beneficial equals: 1 - H( ) 1 ( )) 1 ( /( 1 ( ~
0 θ θ φ θ δ θ − + − + − r y d ). 
If the FTOs’ stories are not validated, then the trust placed by FTCs in FT will 
diminish over time, reducing FTCs’ willingness to buy FT products. If FT benefits are 
widely acknowledged, all FTCs will want to buy FT products and pay r . FTCs who 
do not research will expect to gain  0 )) 1 ( /( ~
0 ≥ − − + r y d θ φ θ θ  from buying FT 
products and their fraction of the FTC population is 1-H(s*). Those who search get 
the payoff  ) 1 ( ) ~ ( 0 θ δ θ − − − − s r s y d . The income   associated with improving the 
standard of living of FTPs would be at least: 
0
~ y
))) 1 *)( ( 1 ( /( *) ( ) ( ) 1 *) ( ))(( 1 ( ( ~
0 δ θ θ θ φ θ − − − + + − + = s H d s H r s r s H y   
This assumes that all r  spent by FTCs goes straight to FTPs, in other words there is 
no dissipation of the transfer. In this setting FTPs would benefit as long as there is a 
continuing supply of positive stories that increase the belief of FTCs φ  in the FT 
scheme.  
 
B. The supply of feel-good stories 
This section focuses on the FTO’s decision to disseminate feel-good stories and their 
impact on FTCs’ decision to buy FT products. FTOs aim to boost FT sales by making 
FTCs feel good about themselves by buying FT. Krier (2005) gives many examples 
such as the Oxfam organisations in Belgium staging 300 different activities around 
the “Fair Play? Fair Pay!” One initiative is often repeated in several countries (for   14
example the Fair Trade Town scheme which operates in the UK, Ireland and 
Belgium) or the FT weeks/fortnights which are now organised on an annual basis in 
France, the UK, Ireland and Germany. 
FTOs appeal to various emotions in the materials used to develop the FT 
brand. One example is the label “Max Havelaar” – the main character in Eduard 
Douwes Dekker’s 1860 novel of the same name. Max is a colonial officer who 
championed the cause of impoverished coffee farmers and battled against a corrupt 
colonial trading regime in Java (Nicholls and Opal (2005, p.10). The stories 
disseminated often concern one individual or a small group of FTPs. Such stories lack 
any tracking of how FTPs performed over time as a result of joining the FT scheme. 
Data are too sporadic to permit any demonstration that FT is overwhelmingly 
beneficial. Below typical extracts from such stories to be found on the Fairtrade 
website are reproduced: 
”The guarantee of the minimum price brings stability. We, producers, are not 
totally subjected to the law of supply and demand. We know that we will be 
paid at least US$69 the quintal. This guarantee makes it possible to plan long 
term, to invest, to develop technical support, in one word, to develop our 
business”, says Felipe Cancari Capcha, a producer from El Ceibo Cooperative, 
a Fairtrade cocoa producer in Bolivia. (Source: 
http://www.fairtrade.net/impact.htm).  
 
Or this one: 
“In 2001 and 2002, during the world coffee crises, our situation was desperate. 
We received between 20 - 25 dollars per quintal (quintal = 100 pounds, 25 
US$ per quintal = 0.25 US$/lb) ... many of the Ecuadorian coffee producers   15
left. We did not have any other choice but to abandon the coffee culture” 
explains Valentín Chinchay, a member of FAPECAFES, a Fairtrade Certified 
Coffee Cooperative in Ecuador. “We are currently selling 80 % of our total 
coffee production under Fairtrade terms. But more important than the higher 
prices is the stability that Fairtrade brings. We are not as vulnerable to market 
volatility as we used to be.” (Source: http://www.fairtrade.net/coffee.htm). 
 
As in Glaeser (2005, p.58) FTOs disseminate these stories at a cost K. K denotes 
campaign spending. Examples of the range of these campaign costs can be found in 
Krier (2005, p.31) reporting that more than €18.3m is spent annually on education, 
public relations and marketing by FTOs (€11.4m by importing organizations, €1.7m 
by Worldshops associations, and €5.1m by labelling initiatives). K also varies 
depending on the organizations’ capabilities in terms of experience and on the 
difficulty of raising funds which is denoted by the variable c. c depends on the size of 
FTOs – the larger the organization the lower values of c. It also depends on the 
location, for instance it seems easier for European FTOs to raise funds than for 
American ones. France, Germany, the UK and the EU support such campaigns by 
directing financial assistance to FTOs aimed at enhancing consumer awareness of FT 
products (European Commission (2003). Nicholls and Opal (2005, p.136) mention 
that Max Havelaar France received more than 40 per cent of its 2002 budget from the 
French ministries of Foreign and Social Affairs. These authors also mention that the 
UK Department for International Development (DFID) has provided aid to Fair Trade 
schemes through Traidcraft. Sidwell (2008) gives the figure of £1.8 million granted 
by DFID to the Fairtrade foundation between 1999 and 2007. 
Membership in the FT scheme offers benefits to FTPs in the form of higher a   16
farm gate price and social premium. This is a transfer of income from FTCs to FTPs 
denoted tR. From this unit transfer must be deducted the certification and annual 
inspection fees that FTPs have to pay in order to be part of FT at level tA. The 
certification basis fee varies depending on the number of farmers or workers in the 
producer group (Table 1). 
Therefore, the total benefit per unit of FT product going to FTPs equals 
, where y stands for the FTPs’ previous income. The average income 
difference between FTPs and non FT producers (NFTPs)’ equals 
y t t A R ) ( −
y nftp Δ − ) 1 (  where 
1-nftp is the share of producers belonging to FT and  y Δ is the previous mean income 
of FTPs minus the mean income of NFTPs. The FT story aims to increase FTPs 
income by   relative to NFTPs.   y A R nftp t t Δ − − ) 1 )( (
 
Proposition 2. Feel-good stories benefit FTPs if and only if  
(1) ( - )(1-nftp)r(1-H(s*)(1- R t A t θ ))>0 
 
Proof. With feel-good stories, a proportion 1-H(s*) of FTCs buy FT goods on the 
strength of feel good stories, because it is too costly for them to carry out background 
research on FT (proposition 1). Thus, the expected net gain for FTPs is 
( - )(1-nftp)r( R t A t θ +(1-θ )(1- H(s*))), which must be positive to make FTPs interested 
in taking part in the FT scheme.  
 
Glaeser (2005, p.65) mentions that considerations other than income are 
important in many examples of hatred. Similarly, FTCs’s motivation for buying FT 
may be conditional not only on income but also on other concerns such as religious   17
beliefs. These beliefs are appealed to by FTOs as shown by Levi and Linton (2003, 
p.420) who refer to an article in the National Catholic Reporter reminding its 
parishioners that “when the coffeehouse craze meets the demands of contemporary 
Catholic identity, young Catholics have a unique responsibility to conform their 
coffee purchases to a tightly formed conscience.” These authors also mention one 
Seattle synagogue buying from Equal exchange because its social action committee 
singled out buying FT products as a way to combat injustice. Therefore FTCs’ buying 
of FT is conditioned both by FTCs’ income I and another variable x, along the 




I x ) denotes the 
average level of x among FTCs. With parameter x, the transfer from FTCs to FTPs is 
proportionate to the difference in, for example, religious beliefs of that individual to 
the average level among FTCs  ) ( x x ) − τ . τ  is a coefficient of proportionality between 
FTCs’ religious or benevolence impulses and how much they want consequently to 
spend on FT.  
If positive stories are disseminated by FTOs, the proportion P of FTCs buying 
FT goods equals (1-H(s*)) )) 1 ( /( θ φ θ θ − + +θ *H(s*). Then, assuming independent 
distribution of religious beliefs and income among FTCs, the total transfer of income 
to FTPs from FTCs with above average religious commitment is 
 
(2)  I
x F x x x X P nftp F τ ) ) ( ( ) 1 (
0
) ) − > −  
 
Assuming that the sale of FT products is always beneficial to FTPs, FTOs 
disseminate feel-good stories at a cost K implying:  
   18
Proposition 3. There exists a value of K, denoted K*, and also a value  * θ  at which 
FTOs are indifferent between disseminating feel-good stories and not disseminating 
them.  
 
Proof. By definition, FTOs maximize the positive value of the net transfer to FTPs: 
I
x F x x P nftp F τ ) ) ( ( ) 1 (
0
) − − - Kc. If FTOs do not send any stories at all, then P, the 
proportion of FTCs who buy FT goods, becomes identical with θ the probability that 
FT benefits FTPs. The K* which satisfies  I
x F x x P nftp F τ ) ) ( ( ) 1 (
0
) − − - K*c = 
I
x F x x nftp F τθ ) ) ( )( 1 (
0
) − −  generates the same outcome for FTPs. That is to say 
spending more and more on advertising FT leads ultimately to the same outcome for 
poor producers as does not advertising at all. This is because the money used for 
advertising is diverted from poor producers. Hence at K*, FTOs are indifferent 
between sending or not communicating stories to FTCs. Consider equation 
θ = P-Kc/( I
x F x x nftp F τ ) ) ( )( 1 (
0
) − − ). The right hand side of this equation is a 
continuous function with  1 0 ≤ ≤θ . If nftp <<1,  >>0 and  I F x x F
x ) − ) (
0 >>0 then 
according to Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, there exists a solution  * θ to this 
equation. If θ is too small, FTOs will not disseminate any story. For a large 
enoughθ , FTOs can start raising funds to finance their campaigns.  
 
For values of K above K*, the payoff is negative and FTOs prefer not to incur the 
costs of a campaign. For values of K below K*, FTOs will engage in a campaign of 
“success stories” as reported by Krier (2005).    19
The probability φ  that FTCs assign to FTOs’ stories at equilibrium equals 
some function G(K*). FTOs’ maximum campaign spending, K*, is taken to mean an 
increase in the supply of FT stories at a given price. As c the cost of raising funds falls, 
K* rises, making FTOs spend more on the dissemination of feel-good stories. FT 
becomes more popular. FTOs with more resources – which at present are the 
European–based ones (Levi and Linton, 2003, p.419) – are more likely to disseminate 
feel-good stories than poorer FTOs such as those in the US. With the FTC's perceived 
positive effect of the FT scheme, d, rising, FTCs who want to help poor producers are 
increasingly convinced that the FT scheme is good for FTPs. They feel good about it 
and buy the FT product. Similarly when FTC's definitive assessment of the benefits of 
the FT scheme, δ, rises, FTCs are more willing to pay a price mark up. 
θ  determines the conditional probability  )) 1 ( /( θ φ θ θ − +  that FTCs place in 
the feel-good story being accurate. A high probability means that FTCs have less 
incentive to probe FT stories as they are already convinced that FT is beneficial to 
FTPs. Such conviction should ensure the success of FT’s campaigns.  
 
IV. TRUST AND FT 
 
If “Fairtrader’s first challenge has been to get consumers to ask,” (Levi and Linton, 
2003, p.419) – in the sense of questioning the conditions in which the items they 
purchase are produced – then this same spirit of enquiry and concern for 
accountability will also incline consumers to ask questions about FT. Indeed, trust 
may be shaken if benefits which small producers or workers get out of the FT 
arrangement are perceived as being relatively small or at least not as important as 
claimed by the FTOs.   20
For a start, FT affects very few producers. FLO reports on its site that there 
were 241 certified coffee producers’ organizations at the end of 2006 (see 
http://www.fairtrade.net/coffee.htm). Assuming with Kohler (2006, p.23) that each 
coffee producing association comprises on average 500 workers; this means that FT 
will have benefited 120,500 workers out of the 25 million coffee producers, or 0.48 
percent. These beneficiaries may even be concentrated in the larger producing 
organisations, because of the difficulties faced by small producer groups in certifying 
their conformity with standards. (Note that high prices and limited accessibility of 
imported services usually operate preventing small producers to achieve such 
standards). Even though the FLO does employ a spectrum of grades and categories 
(see Table 1), the costs of certification may pose a significant barrier to entry for the 
inclusion of small producer groups. 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
While FLO is responsible for establishing producer guidelines and minimum 
pricing in order for any product to carry the FT mark, the complexity and resource 
consuming nature of this process mean that only a few new product groups succeed in 
being certified each year. Registration of additional groups meeting FT standards can 
be difficult due to insufficient demand for their products, or else their inclusion 
further dilutes the benefits for other FT producers (Redfern and Snedker, 2002). FT 
can give certain groups advantages over others because it is not a universally 
accessible scheme. Tallontire (2002, p.18) builds on this in arguing that FT appears to 
embrace a ‘natural selection’ perspective which, for Oswald de Rivero (2001) is the 
very feature of conventional trade that is most blameworthy for its aggravation of   21
global social injustice.  
Howse and Trebilcock, (1996, p.61) mention that the relatively small impact 
of FT leads some authors to view fairtraders as ‘charlatans, protectionists 
masquerading as moralists’. This view is furthered by stories such as the one reported 
by Hal Weitzman (2006) of Coronel Vasquez Bernardino, a coffee labourer from 
Peru, unaware that he is paid below the minimum wage and unaware that he is 
picking FT coffee. In a similar line, Berndt’s (2007) thorough analysis of FT in coffee 
production in Costa Rica and Guatemala supports this view showing that the FT 
scheme excludes the seasonal labourers who constitute the poorest segment of the 
coffee industry. The author remarks that according to FT rules members of FT are 
small landowners, not seasonal labourers who supply the bulk of labour during the 
harvest season. She demonstrates that that while FT recommends that seasonal 
labourers should be paid the minimum wage, no documentation is insisted upon to 
certify that this is what occurs. 
So if the FT scheme is not as beneficial to the poor as claimed by the FTOs, 
whom does it benefit? The FTOs are bound by their status as non-profit or charity 
organizations. Kohler (2006, pp.27-28) finds that 83 per cent of Fairtrade foundation 
expenses are attributable to traders’ and manufacturers’ certification fee income. He 
also points out, though, that benefits drawn by FTOs from the scheme can be viewed 
as a necessary externality and these are not on a scale to undermine the trust that 
consumers have in the scheme. More damaging, however, may be the benefits 
accruing to retailers, this being the one factor which may undermine the willingness 
of FTCs to buy FT products.  
In contrast to FTOs, retailers are not charities and seem to be doing well out of 
the FT scheme either financially or as a marketing tool to improve their reputation,   22
what Kohler (2006, p.29) calls image improvement or “clean washing”. Vihinen and 
Lee (2004, p.6) quote a report undertaken by Max Havelaar (2003) in France 
suggesting that the FT price mark up not only covers the increased margin which 
FTPs obtain under the scheme, but also allows retailers to increase their margins. 
Some UK supermarket chains such as Sainsbury and Tesco may charge higher 
margins on FT goods than on non-FT goods, because they know that consumers are 
expecting to pay more for FT (Stecklow and White, 2004). Interestingly, Kohler 
(2006, footnote 45, p.29) reports that the Fairtrade Foundation’s response to such 
findings has been to indicate that its role is to ensure a fair price for producers, not to 
check supermarkets’ practices. However applicable this may be, though, the Fairtrade 
Foundation risks damage to its brand from even anecdotal evidence about such 
practices by retailers.  
Once again, this paper does not claim to provide a measure of FT impacts, but 
it rather seeks to gauge the impact of stories on the development of FT. One way to 
undermine FT would be to use the same methods as FT itself that is to spread stories 
about how FT may actually not be so beneficial to FTPs. Let us take the example of 
the claim that FT is a lucrative niche for retailers (FTRs).  
With feel-good (and uniform densities) support for FT, margins increase when 
the FT scheme is shown to benefit poor producers. The assumption is that FTRs enjoy 
a profit margin from using the FT brand and that they keep r χ  for themselves and 
redistribute  a χ  to FTPs. The FT scheme is at risk when  a r χ χ > as FTCs might see 
the FT scheme as beneficial primarily for retailers rather than producers. Support for 
the FT scheme is assumed to rise if and only if the scheme is shown to be more 
favourable to producers than to retailers:  
(3)  r A R a nftp t t χ χ > − − + ) 1 )( (    23
If  r χ  rises, FTCs’ propensity to buy FT products declines.  
Having access to information through research, non FT organizations (NFTOs) 
such as journalists, academics, think tanks and competitors can either challenge or 
support the FTOs’ dissemination of feel-good stories. For example Sidwell (2008, 
p.11) from The Adam Smith Institute alleges that FTRs retain most of the profit 
margin: “Fairtrade is an inefficient way to transfer money with 90% of the premium 
paid going to retailers.” 
The cost entailed by both the FTRs/FTOs and NFTOs of spreading 
positive/negative stories is denoted α + A . The FTC and the NFTO know the value of 
A which is a constant. They also know that α  is distributed with a cumulative 
distribution  ) (α J . 
 
Proposition 4 There exists a value of α , denoted  * α , at which NFTOs are 
indifferent towards the spread of FT feel-good stories; at values of α below  * α  the 
NFTOs strictly prefer denigrating the FT scheme; and for values of α above  * α  the 
NFTO prefer to support and reinforce it. 
 
Proof. Assuming that NFTOs are concerned that the inequality (3) should hold: 
) ( A R a t t − + χ I
x F x x P nftp F τ ) ) ( ( ) 1 (
0
) − − - Kc >χr, - (A+α), which implies 
α> ) ( A R a t t − + χ I
x F x x P nftp F τ ) ) ( ( ) 1 (
0
) − − - Kc +A-χr =  * α . The value of  * α is 
falling with increasing H(s) and the value of K* is rising with A and c, and if 
H s H H + = ) (
~
 then the value of  * α  is falling with average H . 
 
Diffusing negative stories against FT is deterred by an increasing feel-good   24
factor, as shown by the comparative static on H . FTCs who feel good are unlikely to 
react to negative stories. The price of challenging this feel-good factor rises as the 
factor spreads among the population. This explains why, despite a certain amount of 
noise about retailers’ margins and doubts about the actual benefits of FT to producers, 
the FT scheme is developing and spreading successfully. This result accords with the 




This paper has shown how the FT movement is able to capitalize on the feel-good 
factor by spreading stories about improvements in the living conditions of poor 
producers as a result of their participation in the FT scheme. By being confronted with 
stories of good deeds, consumers with a natural inclination to benevolence can be 
convinced that the FT scheme is beneficial to small producers in developing 
countries. The supply of feel-good stories is generated by the FT scheme opposing 
itself to conventional international trade. FTOs will build stories to entice consumers 
to buy FT products, arguing that buying FT products is ethical. The probability which 
the FT consumer assigns to FT stories is determined by the strength of the feel-good 
effect. If that effect is intense, negative stories about FT will have only minor impacts.  
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TABLE 
 
Table 1 - Certification Basic Fee 
 
Category  Indicator   Full Inspection  Inspector days     Surveillance Inspection   
Farmers    Total days  On site   Fee  Total days  Inspector days on site   Fee 
A   < 50   2  0.75  € 700.00  2  0.75  € 700.00 
B   50 – 100   2  0.75  € 700.00  2  0.75  € 700.00 
C  101 – 250  2.25  1  € 787.50  2  0.75  € 700.00 
D   251 – 500  2.5  1.25  € 875.00  2.25  1  € 787.50 
E  501 – 1000  3  1.75  € 1,050.00  2.5  1.25  € 875.00 
F  1000  3.5  2.25 €  1,225.00  2.75  1.5 €  962.50 
Note: The certification basic fee is calculated for one product. For each additional product €175.00 (in 
case of surveillance inspection: €87.50) is added to the certification fee. If the promoting body or the 
producer group run a processing installation a fee of between €87.50 - €350.00 is charged by FLO-
CERT. The size of the fee depends on the number of workers employed at the processing installations. 
Additional fees for additional products or processing installations are included in the fee system to 
allow the inspector sufficient time to inspect the additional cultivation areas and processing units. In 
addition, the amount of the certification fee can change due to one or more of the following 
modifications: in cases where the promoting body supports more producer groups, the inspection of 
individual contract production projects may be combined. The number of days the inspector spends at 
the central inspection of the promoting body may be reduced and deducted from the certification fee. 
The deduction will be disclosed in the certification invoice. 
Source: FLO-Cert (January 2007).   31





FTP Fairtrade  producer
θ probability that the sale of FT products is beneficial to FTPs
1-θ probability that the sale of FT products is not beneficial to FTPs
s search cost
probability that FTCs assign to FT stories
FTC's feel good factor
d FTC's perceived positive effect of the FT scheme
average after tax income of FTPs
increased feel good factor after search
δ FTC's definitive assessment of the benefits of the FT scheme.
price mark up on FT goods
K FTOs' campaign spending
K* FTOs' maximum campaign spending
c FTOs' cost of raising funds
tR transfer of income from FTCs to FTPs in the form of higher a farm gate price and social premium
tA certification and annual inspection fees that FTPs have to pay in order to be part of FT.
y  FTPs’ previous income
1-nftp share of producers belonging to FT
previous mean income of FTPs minus the mean income of NFTPs
x religious beliefs or benevolence impulses.
average level of x among FTCs
coefficient of proportionality between FTCs’ religious or benevolence impulses
and how much they want consequently to spend on FT.
P the proportion of FTCs buying FT goods 
share of FTRs' profit margin from using the FT brand kept by FTRs 
share of FTRs' profit margin from using the FT brand redistributed to FTPs

















                                                 
1 See ISEAL Alliance, http://www.isealalliance.org/
2 For details on FLO, see http://www.fairtrade.net/.  
3 See Rabin (1993) for a formalization of fairness. 
4 An analysis of the role of emotions can be found in Frank (1988).  
5 See Vihinen and Lee (2004, pp. 11-13) and Nicholls and Opal (2005, pp. 8-9) for a detailed 
exposition of FTOs. 
6 http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/includes/documents/cm_docs/2008/f/fortnight2008_commercial.pdf. 
7 For a clear discussion of these schemes, see Leclair, (2002, p.957), Bacon, (2005, p.498), Kohler, 
(2006, p.3) and Levi and Linton, (2003, p.415). 
8 See http://www.fairtrade.net/coffee.html. 
9 Variable definitions are reported in Appendix I. 